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3 
Introduction.  
 
”The day for officers to rush forward in the firing line waving their hats and yelling ‘come on boys’ is 
in this new warfare a thing of the past.”1 This quote is written by the American military observer 
John. J. Pershing. Pershing was sent to Japan to learn from the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905. 
Later in life Pershing would command the American armies in France during the First World War.
 In the current historiography the Russo-Japanese war is often labelled as an imperialistic war. 
The unrest under the Russian population is often used as a ‘push factor’ to support this vision. In 
multiple books it can be read that Czar Nicolas II was looking for a quick victory against Japan to win 
the favour of his people. However, this image of the war can be seen as incomplete. This might not 
be an imperialistic war between a European power and an Asian country, but instead it could be seen 
as ‘World War Zero’. This concept means; “that the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905 was worldwide 
in its causes, course, and consequences.”2        
 The concept of ‘World War Zero’ is already been used in two scientific works. Namely the 
collection of essays; The Russo-Japanese War in global perspective: world war zero Volume I Edited 
by Steinberg from 2005 and the second Volume from 2007.3 The first collection of essays gives some 
information about global politics but then mainly focuses on the impact of the war on Russia and 
Japan and the reasons for the war. The second volume has a whole different approach to the war. 
The focus of this work lies more on regional implications, for instance the impact on Manchuria.
 This thesis will focus on the military aspect of this ‘World War Zero’ concept. The main 
question of this research is; did Western military observers, who would later command armies in the 
First World War, learn important military lessons from the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905? During 
the Russo-Japanese war there were a lot of military observers from all the Western powers who 
came to see if Japan was able to defeat the Russians. Russia was seen as the most powerful army of 
its time thanks to its huge number of soldiers. However, these military observers didn’t just witness 
an Asian country defeating a European power, which had never happened before. They also 
witnessed an industrialised war in which all new modern military weapons and strategies were used, 
and which was the perfect example of how the next big European war was going to play out. Thanks 
to this modern way of fighting and the global interest through the military observers the whole 
military side of the war could be part of the ‘World War Zero’ concept. The global consequences of 
the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905 can be seen in the military lessons learned by the Western 
 
1 D. Smythe. Guerrilla Warrior. 123 
2J. Steinberg ed., The Russo-Japanese War in global perspective: world war zero Volume I (Leiden, 2005) XXIII. 
3 Ibidem. XXI and J. Steinberg ed., the Russo-Japanese war in Global Perspective: World War Zero Volume II (Leiden-Boston, 
2007) 3-4. 
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military observers. Because through the lessons learned by the military observers, The Russo-
Japanese war of 1904-1905 would thus play a role in the outcome of the First World War.
 Chapter one of this thesis will focus on the modern fighting of the war and immediately give 
the context needed for chapter two. This modern way of fighting can then also be linked to the 
World War Zero concept. In the works of Steinberg this modern way of fighting is already mentioned 
but not yet proven based on primary sources. Chapter two will then focus on the Western military 
observers and if they learned important lessons from the war that would later play a role in the First 
World War. This chapter can then conclude if the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905 had far reaching 
global consequences.           
 The first three paragraphs of chapter one will look at the Russo-Japanese armies and an 
overview of the war will be discussed. The focus of the last two paragraphs of chapter one lays with 
the land siege of Port Arthur. This is the longest battle of the war in which almost every new weapon 
or strategy was used by either side to gain victory. The fact that this battle lasted six months and 
turned into a form of trench warfare makes it perfect to link it to the First World War, where trench 
warfare would turn out to last the entire war.       
 Chapter one is mainly focused on providing the context and setting needed to fully 
understand the second chapter. If first the war itself isn’t understood, it becomes even more difficult 
to understand the link between the Russo-Japanese war and the First World War that is made in 
chapter two. However, this also gives the perfect opportunity to see if the fighting in the Russo-
Japanese war was as modern as the fighting in the First World War would be. This is a sub question 
for this research because it is linked with the World War Zero concept.     
 Chapter two will focus on four military observers, who would later fight in the First World 
War. The first observer that will be discussed is John Pershing, who would lead the American troops 
in France during the first World War. The second observer is Sir Ian Hamilton, who on behalf of Great 
Britain would lead the Gallipoli invasion in 1915. The third observer is Max Hoffman, who 
orchestrated the victory at Tannenberg against the Russians in 1914. The last observer who will be 
discussed is Enrico Caviglia, he would crush the Austro-Hungarian forces in the battle of Vittorio 
Veneto 1918.           
 One important aspect to keep in mind with this subject is that not all of these four military 
observers had the same rank. They have been chosen because they all played an important role in 
the First World War and they are from different countries. However, Pershing was commander of the 
entire US army in France while Caviglia started the war as a major, which means his influence was 
way less than that of Pershing. The order of how these men are presented is based on the rank they 
held at the end of the First World War.        
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The last fact that plays a role in this thesis is the availability of information about these four persons. 
Not all of them wrote about their experiences in current day Manchuria or later in the First World 
War. For example, Hamilton has his ‘officers’ scrapbook’ from his time in Manchuria and he also kept 
a diary while in Gallipoli, while Pershing never kept a journal of his time with the Japanese army but 
did keep one while in France. Caviglia has written a lot of books about his own experiences, sadly not 
all of them are translated into English.        
 For this thesis, the basis will be a variety of primary sources. Most of these primary sources 
are the official military accounts of the war. These accounts will be used to research if the fighting in 
the Russo-Japanese war was as modern as the fighting in the First World War. The first source is 
Official History (naval and military) of The Russo-Japanese War Volume 1,2 and 3.4 These books are 
written by the official historical section of the committee of Imperial defence. These books are from 
the British general staff and are written based on the information of the other British military 
observers and journalists.         
 The German official account of the Russo-Japanese war is written by Karl von Donat.5 This 
primary source is based on the information of the German military observers, including Max Hoffman 
who was a major general in the First World War. The most interesting part of this book is not that it 
was translated into English so that the British could read what the Germans thought of the war, but 
the fact that von Donat grants himself the liberty to voice his own opinion on the strategical choices 
of the Japanese and Russian generals.         
 This thesis will also use the official work of the United States war Department; Epitome of the 
Russo-Japanese war written by the military information division.6 This work, like the ones before, is 
based on the information given by the American military observers, including John Pershing. the 
work is really written to learn from the Russo-Japanese War. Therefore, it thoroughly describes new 
inventions such as hand grenades and searchlights.      
 The next primary source that will be discussed is not written by a member of the military. 
The work; Japan's fight for freedom; the story of the war between Russia and Japan is written by 
H.W. Wilson.7 This is a series of three books which together composes around 2000 pages of detailed 
information about the war. Wilson was a British journalist who was present in Manchuria during the 
war. This is a nice change from all the official military books because Wilson goes much more into 
detail than the previous mentioned works. Later, Wilson would become chief editor of the Daily Mail. 
 
4 Official History (naval and military) of The Russo-Japanese War Vol.I, II and III, Prepared by the Historical section of the 
Committee of Imperial Defence (London, 1910).  
5 K. von Donat, German official account of the Russo-Japanese War, Prepared in the historical section of the German General 
Staff (London, 1910). 
6 Epitome of the Russo-Japanese war, United States. War Dept. General Staff. Military Information Division (Washington, 
1907). 
7 H.W. Wilson, Japan's fight for freedom; the story of the war between Russia and Japan I, II and III (1904-1906). 
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The only downside of this series is that Japan was an ally of Great Britain and this leads to Wilson 
being in favour of the Japanese. But if you keep this in mind while using these books, they are very 
useful and more detailed than any other book that has been used for this thesis.   
 There is also one Japanese primary source namely; ‘Human bullets: a soldier's story of Port 
Arthur’ written by Sakurai Tadayoshi.8 Sakurai was a Japanese soldier who after the war wrote the 
story of his involvement in the siege of Port Arthur. This book gives us an even closer look at the 
reality of the siege of Port Arthur. This is also the only available primary Japanese source from the 
war, which might give an interesting difference with the mainly western sources.   
  For chapter two there are a variety of primary sources, about the military observers. In these 
primary sources this research will try to find a link between the Russo-Japanese war and the First 
World War. Here it will be possible to see if the military observers had learned lessons from the 
Russo-Japanese war that used while commanding armies in the First World War  
 For the American military observer, John Pershing, two books shall be used. The first is called 
‘My experiences in the World War’. This book is written by Pershing himself and focuses primarily on 
his experience in the First World War.9 The book was first published in 1931, which is quite a long 
time after the First World War. The second book that shall be used is; ’Guerrilla warrior; the early life 
of John Pershing’ by D. Smythe published in 1971.10 This book is more recent then most of the other 
works. The reasons that this fairly recent book is used is because Smythe has used the personal 
archive of Pershing that had never been used before. It gives new information about Pershing and his 
time with the Japanese army. Pershing doesn’t mention this period is his own book, so for this 
information the second book is used.         
 The first primary source used for Hamilton is his own book: A staff officer’s scrapbook during 
the Russo-Japanese war published in 1905.11This was the diary of Sir Hamilton who voluntarily went 
to Manchuria. This means his scrapbook wasn’t meant for the British general staff or for the big 
public. It contains his own visions and ideas which makes it a one of a kind source. His diary from his 
time in Gallipoli; Gallipoli Diary Volume 1/2 by I. Hamilton published in 1920, will be used in chapter 
two to see if there were things he learned from his time in the ‘Manchuria campaign’.12 The book 
‘Defeat at Gallipoli’ by N. Steel and P. Hart published in 1995 will also be used to get more specific 
details about the Gallipoli invasion.13 
  For the German military observer, Max Hoffman, his own book shall be used; ‘The War of 
 
8 S. Tadayoshi, Human bullets: a soldier's story of Port Arthur (Boston, 1907).  
9J.J. Pershing, My experiences in the World War. (New York, 1931). 
10 D. Smythe, ’Guerrilla warrior’; the early life of John Pershing’ (New York, 1971).  
11Sir I. Hamilton, A staff officer’s scrapbook during the Russo-Japanese war (London, 1905). 
12 I. Hamilton, Gallipoli Diary (London, 1920). 
13 N. Steel and P. Hart, Defeat at Gallipoli (London, 1995).  
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Lost Opportunities’ published in 1924.14 In this book Hoffman describes his First World War 
experiences and also writes about his time with the Japanese army. Originally this book was in 
German, next to the fact that it’s been translated into English nothing changed in comparison to the 
original book. The book is written ten years after the First World War.     
 For the last military observer, Enrico Caviglia, the article; “Enrico Caviglia – the forgotten 
Italian. A Life as Soldier, Writer, serving the country”, written by Giacomo Innocenti and published in 
2014, will be used.15Caviglia has written about his experiences, however everything is in Italian and 
almost nothing is translated into English. This article by historian Innocenti is one of the only English 
sources that contains translated primary source material from Caviglia himself. Thanks to this article 
it is now possible to read some of Caviglia’s experiences from his time with the Japanese army. To 
make up for the language barrier when it comes to Caviglia’s experiences from the First World War, 
the book The Italian Army and the First World War by J. Gooch will be used.16 Gooch has used the 
diaries from Caviglia, so the information that is needed is now accessible in English.  
 For the second chapter one article of edited volume, The Russo-Japanese War in global 
perspective: world war zero Volume I is particularly useful, namely; military observers, eurocentrism, 
and world war zero By David Jones.17 Jones explains were these military observers came from and 
why they were important. He also writes about the diplomatic usefulness of these observers and the 
reasons for Japan to let these observers join their armies. This is important information needed to 
fully understand these military observers.        
 The focus of the current historical debate lays with explaining how Japan was able to defeat 
the Russians. Most scholarly works focus on this topic. A couple of these scholarly works which are 
used as secondary sources are for example; the short victorious war: the Russo-Japanese conflict, 
1904-05 by D. Walder.18 Walder has written this book from the perspective of the ‘standard’ vison, 
that Russia needed a quick victory to gain favour of the people. The next book also thinks in this 
‘standard vision’. The tide at sunrise: a history of the Russo-Japanese war, 1904-1905 by D. Warner is 
one of the most important books when researching this topic.19 In almost every scholarly work about 
the Russo-Japanese war you can find this book in the footnotes. So, there are a lot of important 
scholarly works that focus on the debate, but almost none of them look beyond the end of the 
Russo-Japanese war.           
 This thesis and the bigger concept of World War Zero stand directly opposed to the 
 
14 M. Hoffman, the war of lost opportunities’ (Eschenburg, 2011).  
15G. Innocenti, Enrico Caviglia – the forgotten Italian. A Life as Soldier, Writer, serving the country in the collection of essays; 
40th international congress of military history. (Sofia, 2015).  
16J. Gooch, The Italian Army and the First World War. (Cambridge, 2014).  
17J. Steinberg ed., The Russo-Japanese War in global perspective: world war zero Volume I (Leiden, 2005). 
18D. Walder, The short victorious war: the Russo-Japanese conflict, 1904-05. (London, 1973). 
19D. Warner, The tide at sunrise: a history of the Russo-Japanese war, 1904-1905. (London, 1975). 
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‘standard’ works of Walder and Warner. The works of Walder and Warner both originated from the 
1970’s while the works of Steinberg originate from the early 2000s. Here we can clearly see that forty 
years later there is a new outlook on the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905. This means that the 
historiographical debate is very much alive, and this research is thus current.   
 The last important scholarly work is; the Russo-Japanese war, lessons not learned by James D. 
Sisemore published in 2003.20 Sisemore researches the ‘Lessons not learned’ from the Russo-
Japanese war. For this he describes a couple of big battles including the siege of Port Arthur. He is a 
military man and that shows in his used sources, he also used the Scrapbook of I. Hamilton and the 
books of the General staff from Britain and the USA, next to that he also uses a lot of in-depth 
military handbooks. However, his focus is more on the strategic lessons that should have been 
learned from the war. He does not connect this to the First World War. Sisemore also mentions that 
there were military observers but doesn’t conclude them in the idea of ‘Lessons not learned’. The big 
difference between his work and this thesis is the fact that this one describes the ‘lessons learned’ 
based on experiences from four officers during the First World War, and not ‘the lessons they should 
have learned.’      
  
 
20 D. Sisemore, the Russo-Japanese war, lessons not learned. (Kansas, 2003). 
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Chapter 1. The Russo-Japanese war.  
 
1.1 The Japanese army.  
The start of the Russo-Japanese war is a long and complicated story. There are a lot of different 
aspects and political involvements that all lead to the start of this war. Important to know is that 
Western countries such as Great-Britain, Germany and the United States of America all played 
important roles in the origins of this war. Political, economic and military developments originated 
from this war had far reaching consequences. The Russo-Japanese war was not just an imperialistic 
war but perhaps it should be described as World War Zero. To understand the developments in 
warfare and their consequences, it is important to first look at both the Russian and Japanese armies 
at the start of the war.  
The Japanese army had two important Western trained commanders. The first being Iwao 
Oyama and the second was Gentaro Kodama. Both generals were first trained by French officers and 
later by Germans. General Oyama was sent to Europe to get a European education in war. This is why 
he was present at the German side of the French-German war of 1870-71.21 Here Oyama became 
quite close to the famous Prussian chief of staff Von Moltke. Thanks to this good relationship Von 
Moltke would sent one of his most promising officers to train the Japanese army, this was Jakob 
Meckel.22 General Kodama worked closely with Jakob Meckel and together they formed the new 
‘Western styled’ Japanese army. In 1890 Kodama would visit Meckel in Germany and would stay 
there for two years to get a European education of war.23  
The military advisor Jakob Meckel, a veteran of the German-Austria war of 1866 and French-
German war of 1870, would spend three years rebuilding the Japanese army based on the Prussian 
model of discipline. This model was liked by the Japanese thanks to their history of samurai 
discipline. Even though Meckel was only in Japan for three years, his influence on the Japanese army 
was immense. The work of Karl Donat shows just how important the Prussian Major was. All the 
tactics and ways of the German military were being taught. The army was divided into divisions and 
regiments, just like the German army.24  
Meckel also introduced the German idea of ‘Kriegspielen’ where Generals could test their 
own ideas and tactics in large scale ‘play battles’. Meckel would also personally teach the 60 highest 
ranking officers how Germany thought about warfare and strategy. After Meckel left, other German 
officers stayed and trained the Japanese army until the start of the first Sino-Japanese war.25 The 
 
21J. Sisemore, The Russo-Japanese war, Lessons not Learned. 65. 
22Warner, The tide at sunrise, 44-45. 
23B. Martin, Japan and Germany in the Modern World. 39-41. 
24Donat, German official account, 71-73. 
25Warner, The tide at sunrise, 44-49. 
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victory for Japan in this war would be labelled by Japanese generals as ‘the Meckel victory’. Not all 
the lessons from Meckel were as useful. Meckel was an enthusiast off large-scale infantry attacks. 
However these sorts of attacks were cut from the Germany manual of war in 1914, after it proved to 
be highly unsuccessful against the machine gun.26 Japan would heavily rely on this tactic of large 
scale infantry attacks during the Russo-Japanese war, which can be seen as a reason for the high 
amount of casualties.   
In February 1904 the new German styled Japanese army 
consisted of 250 thousand active soldiers and at the end of the war 
this number would increase to 600 thousand soldiers.27 This 
modern Japanese army was formed after 1850, the year the new 
‘breech-loading rifle’ was invented. This new rifle meant that it was 
now possible to fire quicker and there was no longer any loose 
gunpowder involved because there were now cartridges. For the 
Japanese army this was the first rifle they ever used. So, unlike the 
Russian army they never even knew about the Napoleon styled 
‘volley fire’.28  
Another important aspect in the Japanese army was the idea of ‘Auftragstaktik’. The concept 
was invented by the German chief of staff von Moltke, who is often described as “the embodiment of 
Prussian military organization and tactical genius.”29 The concept meant that fulfilling a military 
assignment was more important than the way in which the goal was achieved. In the field this gave 
lower ranking officers more freedom to adapt to the current situation.30   
The Japanese army, educated by Meckel, had great faith in large scale infantry attacks. Their 
whole strategy was built on this idea and speed was of great importance. Therefore, the Japanese 
army had few machine guns at the start of the war because the heavy machine guns slowed down 
the infantry. The couple of machine guns they did use were the French Hotchkiss M1897, which the 
American army would also use during the First World War. This French machine gun was a lot lighter 
than any other machinegun.31 Furthermore each Japanese division consisted of 36 artillery pieces. 
Almost half of these cannons were the old Napoleonic style cannons, which couldn’t fire in the air 
but had to be pointed directly at the enemy. However, to the great surprise of the Russians, the 
 
26Martin, Japan and Germany, 40. 
27Walder, The short victorious war, 81. 
28Hamilton, A staff officer’s, 113.  
29 Connaughton, The war, 17. 
30Ibidem. 17-18.  
31Warner, The tide at sunrise, 167. 
Figure 1 Japanese army waiting for a 
Russian attack 1904 
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Japanese also had the German 11cm Krupp cannons. These were some of the most modern cannons 
and had more reach and bigger shells then any of their Russian counterparts.32 
1.2 The Russian army. 
The Russian army consisted of 1,1 million active soldiers in 1904. There were also 2,5 million 
reserves who could be mobilized at the start of the war. Next to this the Russians could also rely on 
350 thousand Cossacks and another 700 thousand militia troops. Thanks to these huge numbers 
there was little military skill within the Russian army.33 Walder even goes as far to say that; “Each 
Russian soldier was prepared to die for his Tsar, but none of them could match the skill of a 
professional Western soldier.”34  
The most important lessons that any Russian soldier would get is that the bayonet would 
eventually decide every battle. Thanks to this, the Russians soldiers are also labelled as “the worst 
shot of any existing great army in Europe.”35 This is also one of the reasons that the Russian soldiers 
still relied on the old school ‘volley fire’. The goal of the ‘volley fire’ was to literally ‘shower’ the 
enemy with bullets. Sir Ian Hamilton has an outspoken opinion about this ‘volley fire’. He wrote; “A 
volley is the negation of marksmanship as far as the individual is concerned for, he never knows and 
never can know whether his bullet was one of those that missed or of one of those who hit. For the 
general purpose of war, the volley is dead as the dodo.”36  
The Russian army did however see the usefulness of the machinegun, which were bought in 
great quantities. The Russians used the English Maxim gun, which would prove to be one of the 
deadliest machineguns in World War One. These guns were expensive and were believed to be of 
great importance to the European based armies. This was one of the reasons that only a couple of 
machineguns were given to the Eastern divisions, while a great number of guns stayed in the 
Western part of Russia. During this period, the Western part was seen as 
the more important part of Russia.37 The Russians were also busy with 
replacing their old cannons with new ‘quick fire artillery’. In the past, the 
cannons had to re-adjust their aim after each shot. With these new 
cannons this was no longer necessary, meaning that they could fire 
more quickly. Only a small part of the Russians army really understood 
how these new cannons worked and in a lot of cases the first shot fired 
with these canons was fired at Japanese soldiers, rather than at practice targets.38 
 
32Donat, German official account, 208. 
33Warner, The tide at sunrise, 166-169. 
34Walder, The short victorious war, 82. 
35Hamilton, A staff officer’s, 113. 
36 Ibidem. 113-114. 
37Steinberg, world war zero, 163. 
38Warner, The tide at sunrise, 167. 
Figure 2 Picture showing a Russian 
machine gun crew during the Siege of Port 
Arthur. 
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The last important piece of information that should be known, in order to fully understand 
this war and the Siege of Port Arthur lays in Siberia. The Russian army was almost seven times larger 
than the Japanese but there would be no battle in which the Russians could provide more than twice 
the number of Japanese soldiers. This is because of the huge distance between the West of Russia, 
where almost all the soldiers were stationed, and the battlefield in the East. There was just one 
railway which covered the huge distance of 8800 km, the Trans-Siberia railway. However, at the start 
of the war this railway wasn’t even finished. This is why during the whole war only 210 thousand 
Russian soldiers were able to reinforce the Eastern divisions, which consisted of 400 thousand 
soldiers. Not only did reinforcements have to be transported across this one railway, but also 
ammunition, clothes, medicine and food. This had the result that there was a deficit off all these 
items.39  
To conclude the first two paragraphs, the Russian army was far larger than the Japanese. 
However, there were some real logistical problems in getting this huge army to the front because 
most of these Russians troops were stationed in European Russia. Modernisation within the Russian 
army happened slowly and there were no Western military advisors as was the case in Japan. 
Nonetheless, Russian army modernisation was underway in the prelude to the war with Japan. The 
Japanese army on the other hand was smaller yet more modern than the Russian army. The Japanese 
were trained by experienced German officers and equipped with the latest European weapons and 
cannons. This means that the fairly new Japanese army was well prepared for its first ‘Western war’.  
 
1.3 Summary of the war          
This paragraph will give a short overview of the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905. This is not only 
needed to fully understand the links made in chapter two. It is also necessary to look at the 
modernity of the fighting.  
 On 8 February 1904 Japanese Admiral Heihachiro Togo attacked the Russian fleet in Port 
Arthur, without an official declaration of war. This ‘first Pearl Harbour’ was the start of the Russo-
Japanese war. Just as with the Americans in 1941 at Pearl harbour, the entire Russian navy was 
present in Port Arthur and unaware of the danger that was just outside the harbour. Russian 
commanders were aware of the current tensions with Japan, but as long as there was no declaration 
of war, they were not worried. It all went according to Togo’s plan and before the Russians even 
knew what was happening, the attack was already over 40      
 In 1904 Togo was the commander of the entire Japanese navy and the whole outcome of the 
war rested on his shoulders. If Togo couldn’t destroy the Russian navy in Port Arthur, there would be 
 
39F. Patrikeeff, Railways and the Russo-Japanese war (2007, New York) 43-46. 
40Official History (naval and military) of The Russo-Japanese War Vol.I, 58. 
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no way the Japanese soldiers could cross the sea and land safely in Korea.41 In a quick attack Admiral 
Togo’s goal was achieved. The Russian navy was damaged and disorganized. This fleet would not be 
able to intercept the Japanese infantry, who were already underway to land in Korea. The Japanese 
troops were able to land safely and moved quickly north to the border of Korea and Manchuria. The 
Japanese knew that if they wanted to win this war, they had to strike fast before the huge number of 
Russian reinforcements could arrive from the West. The first battle of the war would take place at 
this natural border, the Yalu river.   
The Russian commander in chief of the East, Aleksej Koeropatkin, believed he needed at least 
six months to fully prepare his army, and then he would be able to go on the offensive. To buy 
himself some time he sends 25 thousand soldiers to defend the Yalu river, a front of about 250 
kilometres. In 1894 the Japanese had fought at this same location against the Chinese, so they knew 
their battleground. The Russians didn’t think very highly of their Asian foe. The idea that the 
Japanese would have modern cannons wouldn’t have crossed any Russian officer’s mind. This is the 
reason that the Russians took no effort to conceal or strategically place their own cannons, instead 
they were all stationed next to each other. It took the Japanese Krupp-howitzers half an hour to 
destroy the Russian guns, after which they launched a compact assault in a small area to break 
through the Russian line of defence.42 With small boats and floating bridges they completely 
surprised and overwhelmed the Russian defenders. After this breakthrough, the Russians retreated.43
 During the battle of the Yalu river the second Japanese 
army landed on the Lioadong Peninsula with just one goal; to 
capture Port Arthur. This would lead to the Siege of Port Arthur. 
This siege would last for over six months and would cost both 
sides more than 50 thousand casualties.44 Meanwhile the first 
Japanese army pushed further into Manchuria after their victory 
at the Battle of the Yalu river. Their next big battle would take 
place near Liaoyang, a great city whose railway connected Port 
Arthur with the capital Mudken. If the Japanese could take 
Liaoyang it would mean that they could march on Mudken and 
that Port Arthur wouldn’t get any more supplies. The Russians 
also saw the importance of this city and prepared to defend it 
with 158 thousand soldiers and 609 cannons. The Japanese attacked with 125 thousand soldiers and 
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Figure 3 Map showing the movements of 
the Japanese armies 
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170 cannons.45 There was just one problem with the Russian defence which the British military 
observer Hamilton points out; “The Boers, it must be allowed, would have been invisible in these 
trenches, whereas the Russians where plainly to be seen, not only by the infantry of the attack, but 
also by the artillery, which makes a considerable difference.”46 The Russian defenders didn’t use 
camouflage, which Hamilton believes was necessary in this new modern war.   
Thanks to faulty information Koeropatkin believed that he was badly outnumbered by the 
Japanese in Liaoyang. He believed that only a “daring Russian attack” could bring him victory. After a 
week of fighting he decided to lead an all-out attack from the city. When this attack failed, he 
retreated back to Mudken and gave the well defend city of Liaoyang quite easily to the Japanese.47 
This seems like a great failure of the Russian army, however the truth has more details. The Japanese 
General Oyama knew he was outnumbered, outgunned and that the city had strong defences. 
Because of this he took a great risk and from the first day 
of battle he sent all his soldiers to the front lines. 
Normally every capable general keeps a reserve of 
soldiers behind in case of an enemy breakthrough or 
flanking manoeuvre. Oyama knew he didn’t have this 
luxury so he took a great risk that would eventually pay 
off. This is one of the reasons why the Russian 
Koeropatkin believed he was outnumbered while in fact 
he had more soldiers.     
 “It was in accordance with Russian custom, when he, 
Koeropatkin, retained a strong reserve, more than a Division. 
A reserve is never provided for its own sake but must be engaged to the last man when the struggle 
for the mastery demands it.”48 Karl von Donat also believes that Koeropatkin should have sent in his 
reserves just like Oyama did. The Russians lost around 19 thousand men while the Japanese lost 22 
thousand, but still this was a huge Japanese victory. The fact that Japan was able to gain victory while 
the Russians had around 500 cannons more than they had, is a really important aspect. This is one of 
the few battles before the Second World War, where an army which was so ‘outgunned’ managed to 
defeat his enemy.           
 After this battle the first ‘Western’ or ‘European’ reinforcements would arrive for the 
Russians. Koeropatkin found new courage and believed with these new European troops he would be 
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Figure 4 Map showing all the battles of the 
Russo-Japanese war. 
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able to crush the Japanese.49 His main goal was to break the siege of Port Arthur and save the 
harbour. The Japanese knew his goal and waited for him on the plains called Shaho. The Russian 
force numbered 210 thousand soldiers and the Japanese had 170 thousand soldiers.50 A German 
military observer describes what happens next. “A plan frequently recommended by von Moltke was 
therefore adopted.(..) it would be much better to assume the offensive after several attacks of the 
enemy had been repulsed, than to attack, oneself, the enemy at great sacrifice.”51 Oyama would do 
exactly the same and after three Russians attacks he would go on the offensive and defeat the 
Russians. Although Oyama used the German strategy, Donat isn’t content as he points out that 
Oyama made a big mistake; “In a manner similar to Oyama, Napoleon had tried, in the battle of 
Wagram on July 6, 1809, at one and the same time to envelop the right wing of the Austrians and to 
penetrate their centre at Sissenbrunn; he succeeded only in the envelopment.”52 Oyama had tried to 
use a tactic of Napoleon, which the Germans saw as a bad strategy. This tactic indeed resulted in 
Oyama not being able to encircle the Russians, which would have been a much bigger victory. Now 
the defeated Russians could reorganize and fight another day. The Russians lost 41 thousand soldiers 
while the Japanese lost only 21 thousand.   
During this time, Port Arthur fell to the Japanese. This meant that the second Japanese army 
would now be able to reinforce the first Japanese army. Koeropatkin saw the danger in the joining of 
these two armies and tried to gain a quick victory before the Second Japanese army would arrive. In 
the Battle of San-De-Pu, the Russians had 50 thousand soldiers more than the defending Japanese. 
However, as Hamilton puts it: “the Japanese have learned some lessons, the Russians have clearly 
not.”53 The Russians had no better plan than to attack head on and suffered horrible losses to the 
Japanese machineguns. At the start of the war, the Japanese had few machine guns, but after every 
battle they started to incorporate the captured Russian machine guns. The battle lasted only three 
days because reports came in telling of the arrival of Japanese General Nogi and his second army, 
after which Koeropatkin decided to retreat back to Mudken. The Russians lost 23 thousand men and 
the Japanese lost 9 thousand men.54 
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The battle of Mudken would be the last deciding battle of the war. As General Oyama put it: “I need 
a Sedan to finish this war.”55 He referred to the German victory at Sedan during the French-German 
war of 1870. Where the French army was encircled, and which directly finished 
the war. General Oyama, who until now had 
used nothing but his familiar German tactics 
decided it was time for something new. He 
was afraid that after a year of fighting the 
Russians would have learned his 
strategies.56 To the delight of the British 
military observers, Oyama chose for the ‘Horns and Head of the 
Buffalo’ formation.57 This was the standard offensive tactic from 
the Zulu tribe, with who the British were at war in 1897. Oyama 
attacked with 207 thousand soldiers, thousand cannons and 254 machine guns. The Russians force 
numbered 276 thousand strong, they had 1200 cannons and 54 machineguns. This would be the 
largest battle ever fought, until the battles of the First World War.58  
  Oyama’s plan worked perfectly and after a week of fighting one of his officer’s writes: “until 
now I never thought it possible that we could surround the Russians and bring about a second 
Sedan.”59 The Japanese did indeed manage to incircle the whole Russian army, however there would 
not be a second Sedan. Koeropatkin figured out what was happening and decided to focus on a small 
part of the battle and broke through the Japanese lines. He was now able to retreat back to Tiehiln, 
the next major city. In the chaotic retreat, the Russians lose almost 500 cannons and all 
machineguns, but the major part of the army survived and was able to keep fighting.60  
  The Japanese army managed to gain a massive victory at Mudken, but Oyama believed he 
had failed. He wasn’t able to completely destroy the Russian army and end the war. The German 
Donat believes that Oyama did everything right and was not to blame for this. He believed the 
problem lay elsewhere, namely the lack of superior numbers; “Over and over again is seen the 
disadvantage of the inferior numbers of the Japanese; it deprived them also at another place of the 
chance of taking advantage of a situation.”61 
 After the battle of Mudken the Russian army would be able to get even more fresh 
reinforcements from Europe while Japans manpower had run out. To make matters worse for the 
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Figure 5 This tactic meant that the 
attacking army would split into 3 
groups. The ‘Horns, 2’ would 
attack the enemy flanks to pin 
them down. After this the ‘head, 
3’ would charge the centrum of 
the enemy. If the battle went well 
the ‘loins, 4’ would move around 
the battle and cut off the enemy’s 
retreat. If the battle didn’t go well, 
the loins could be used to 
reinforce the centrum, or the 
‘head, 3’.  
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Japanese, the large Russians Baltic fleet was about to reach Japanese waters. If Japan would lose 
control of the sea, the war would be lost. As Admiral Togo would say on the day of battle: “the rise or 
fall of the empire depends upon the result of this engagement. Do your utmost, every one of you.”62 
The naval battle of Tsushima would last no longer than two hours. Admiral Togo, who had almost 
eight battleships less than his Russian foe, preformed his now famous ‘Togo Turn’, see figure 6. 63 This 
move was so daring that Russian Admiral Semenov later would write: “I looked and looked and not 
believing my eyes, I could not put down my glasses. HOW RASH.”64     
 The Russian Baltic fleet lost 21 ships and suffered 11 thousand casualties. Admiral Togo, now 
nicknamed Nelson of the East, lost only four destroyers and 700 men.65 The now famous ‘Togo Turn’ 
would also be used by the British during the naval battle of Jutland against the German empire in 
World War One.66  
  Emperor Wilhelm the second of Germany send his cousin Tsar Nicholas II of Russia a 
telegram after the news of the defeat had reached Europe: “From the purely military strategical 
point of view, the defeat in the Straits of Korea ends the chances for a decided turn of the scales in 
your favour.”67 Eventually the defeat at Mudken and Tsushima would lead to the peace of 
Portsmouth, signed on 5 September 1905.  
  The smaller yet more modern Japanese army was able 
to win land battles again and again, without gaining the upper 
hand in the war. The Russians were able to bring in more and 
more reinforcements from the West, while the Japanese army 
already was at its maximum strength in the Battle of Mukden. 
This would be an important aspect as to why Japan wanted 
peace. The battle at sea was a different story. Here the 
Japanese navy was also smaller than the Russian navy, but 
again more modern. On sea, Japan was able to gain the upper 
hand after the decisive win in the battle of Tsushima. This 
naval supremacy of Japan and the Russian 
humiliation of the battle of Tsushima would play 
a big role in Russia suing for peace.  
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Figure 6 Togo's 'crossing the T' in the battle of Tsushima. 
This Togo turn means that Admiral Togo didn’t use the well-
known tactic of ‘crossing the t’. But after moving his entire 
fleet to the right he came to a complete stop and turned 
directly to the left. This resulted in his fleet being perfectly 
lined up to open fire on the approaching Russians ships, 
who had yet to turn to be able to fire back. 
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Most importantly, this paragraph doesn’t just show how the Russo-Japanese war went and how it 
ended. The spectacular number of soldiers and casualties combined with the large number of 
cannons and machineguns that were used in the battle of the Russo-Japanese war, show that the 
Russo-Japanese war was indeed the first large scale modern war of the 20th century. Thus, this war 
was the perfect opportunity for the Western military observers to learn military lessons that could 
have been useful in the First World War.  
1.4 Reaching Port Arthur  
This paragraph will deal with the Japanese invasion of the 
Liaodong Peninsula and the road towards Port Arthur. The fighting of 
the siege of Port Arthur will be discussed in the next paragraph. The 
reason that these beach landings and the road to Port Arthur are also 
thoroughly described, is because the situation and the fighting is 
similar to that of the British Forces at Gallipoli in the First World War. 
The British military observer who will be discussed in chapter two, Ian 
Hamilton, would lead the Gallipoli invasion. If we are to make a direct 
link between Gallipoli and the Road to Port Arthur, it is necessary to first fully describe the Japanese 
landing on the Liaodong peninsula.  
  The battle for Port Arthur started just after the Japanese victory at the Yalu River. If General 
Oyama was not able to cross the Yalu river, the second Japanese army, led by Maresuke Nogi, 
wouldn’t land on the Liaodong peninsula but would be send to Korea to reinforce him. However, 
Oyama was able to win and cross the river, and so Nogi’s second army was sent to take Port Arthur.68
 The first important battle that took place within the Siege of Port Arthur was the battle of the 
Nanshan hills. These hills are about 90 meters high and have a great view of everything approaching 
Port Arthur. Russia hired 5 thousand Chinese labourers to improve the defences in 1900. This 
resulted in the construction of five layers of trenches, 5 kilometres of barbed wire, a thousand 
landmines were placed, and two immense searchlights were constructed. Also, ten pillboxes 
equipped with machine guns were build and fifteen cannon positions, which protected around 90 
cannons.69 The Russians believed these defences to be undefeatable. The Russian Colonel Tretyakov 
was in command of 38 hundred Russian soldiers, sent to defend these hills.  
  The first day of battle took place on the 26th of May. General Oku commanded 35 thousand 
troops and 216 cannons. Oku was also able to call in additional shelling from 4 Japanese’s cruisers. It 
took the Japanese less than 5 hours to destroy most of the Russian cannons.70 This was mainly the 
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Figure 7 Liaodong Peninsula 
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result of the old Russian tactics. They still believed cannons had to be as high as possible, so that they 
could provide direct fire upon the enemy. The new long-range artillery was able to shoot from an 
‘indirect fire role’. This means that thanks to its new range, the gunners didn’t have to see the enemy 
themselves, but they could fire into the sky and still hit their targets. The Japanese did use this new 
way of indirect fire and thanks to this, they were able to destroy most of the Russian guns before 
they fired back.71          
 After this bombardment followed by the shelling of the four Japanese cruisers, the first 
Japanese infantry started to attack. It didn’t take long for the 
Japanese commanders to see the destructive fire power of the 
well-entrenched machine guns combined with barbed wire. 
Again and again the Japanese officers asked for artillery 
support to destroy these guns, but thanks to their concrete 
protection and the strategic use of the high hills the Japanese 
were unable to destroy them.72 In the late afternoon General 
Oku ordered his artillery to “use every last shell if necessary” to 
destroy these machine guns.73 While this bombardment took 
place, he also sent a division to swim across the sea to flank 
the Russian defenders. Colonel Tretyakov saw this movement 
and personally led a group of soldiers to protect his exposed 
Western flank. At the same time, General Fock believed it was 
time to retreat, his reasons why are unknown. After the battle, 
the Japanese army needed two whole days to continue their 
march towards Port Arthur, which indicates how difficult a beach invasion followed by an assault on 
a defensive position had become.74  
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Figure 8 drawing giving an impression 
of the effect of Russian barbed wire 
combined with machine gun fire 1904 
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Figure 9 Russian 
defence positions in 
Nan Shan. 75 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the 26th of June, the first big Japanese attack was launched on the last remaining hills 
between them and Port Arthur. The first three days Nogi attacked with almost 60 thousand soldiers 
but made little to no progress. Again, the trenches and barbed wire combined with well-placed 
machine guns seem to fully stop the Japanese attack. Nogi then decided to focus his 180 cannons 
strong artillery bombardment not directly on the Russians, but just in front of them. This 
bombardment managed to destroy parts of the barbed wire, which made the next Japanese assault 
easier. Were in the Battle of Nan Shin the hills had not only protected the Russians against enemy 
artillery, it had also protected the battlefield itself. Now this was not the case, and the craters that 
formed thanks to the shells provided cover for assaulting Japanese soldiers. After the first defensive 
position was taken by the Japanese, the Russians tried to perform a counterattack. The Japanese had 
quickly set up their own machineguns and this attack was stopped quite easily.76 
After the last hills were captured, the Japanese army reached Port Arthur. The Russians had 
used the time between the start of the war and the Japanese reaching Port Arthur well, and the 
defences around Port Arthur were greatly increased and modernised. The Russian defence plan was 
to have two defensive lines running through the hills surrounding Port Arthur. The first line of 
defence was supposed to be the most well protected one. This first line of defence would eventually 
consist of six fortified battery positions, six concrete bunkers each with four machineguns and nine 
smaller pillboxes with one machine gun each. Between and in front of these bunkers were trenches 
and ditches to provide Russian infantry with cover and force the attacker in the open. In front of each 
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trench barbed wire was placed. The second line of defence would consist of four concrete bunkers 
and a network of trenches.77   
To man these defences the Russian General Konstantin Smirnov commanded around 50 
thousand soldiers. He would boost these numbers by ordering 10 thousand soldiers of the Russian 
Far East fleet into the trenches. Next to these soldiers, Smirnov was able to use 650 field guns. 186 of 
these guns were originally from ships of the Russian Far East fleet.78  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
79 
The reason that this first part of the siege of Port Arthur is so thoroughly described is because 
the naval landing and hill battles on the peninsula closely resemble the conditions of the Gallipoli 
landings of 1915. Furthermore, this paragraph explicitly shows the modernity of the siege of Port 
Arthur. The modernity of the Russian army fighting in the Russo-Japanese war is debatable because 
as said in chapter one, most of the modern and well-trained soldiers would stay in Europe. However, 
when the modernity of the defences becomes clear, this is no longer an argument against the 
modernity of the Russians. The concrete bunkers and pillboxes combined with large networks of 
trenches and barbed wire show that this siege of Port Arthur would become a battle which the world 
had not yet seen.  
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Figure 10 Russian defensive positions at Port Arthur. 
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1.5 The siege of Port Arthur  
This last paragraph of chapter one will deal with the siege of Port Arthur. Here the fighting would last 
for more than six months and the battle would result in fierce trench fighting. This trench fighting 
was the same as how most of the First World War would turn out to be fought. So perhaps here the 
Western military observers could have learned some invaluable lessons. Again, this battle is 
described thoroughly to give the necessary context for chapter two, and to prove the modernity of 
the fighting in the Russo-Japanese war.  
  The first attack on Port Arthur on the 7th of August was led by General Nogi. His first goal was 
to capture the hills on the East side of the defences. In this battle for the Eastern hills it was the first 
time that the Japanese soldiers could use hand grenades in large quantity. Wilson describes the 
devastating effect of these hand grenades very well: “With bayonets fixed they moved over the crest, 
the man in the front rank flung hand-grenades into the Russian defenders. Within a blink of an eye 
the whole scene was nothing less than a popular representation of hell.” 80 These hand grenades 
proofed useful in attacking the entrenched Russian soldiers. However, getting close enough to throw 
these hand grenades was difficult. In two days the Japanese lost 1460 soldiers in trying to take these 
hills while the Russian defenders lost 450.81   
General Nogi was responsible for the capture of Port Arthur in 1894 from the Chinese. He captured 
Port Arthur with a frontal attack. As Donat puts it: “Nogi knew that only a full-scale frontal attack 
would give him victory, even before he landed near Port Arthur.”82 On the 21st of August Nogi 
launched his assault which would last three full days. The defences did their work and unlike in 1894, 
the Russians had machineguns, high impact cannons, trenches, bunkers, hand grenades and barbed 
wire. Sakurai Tadayoshi, a Japanese soldier, would later describe the battle; thus: “The bodies of the 
brave dead-built hill upon hill, their blood made streams in the valleys.”83  
At the end of the 24th the Japanese had made no real progress. They lost 15 thousand 
soldiers while the Russians lost around 3 thousand. General Nogi’s frontal assault proofed to be a 
disaster. In the next week General Kodama was sent by Oyama to aid general Nogi in the capture of 
Port Arthur. Kodama understood that another frontal assault would cost him his army, so instead he 
chose for a siege strategy. His soldiers would start on digging trenches and he ordered heavy 
howitzer cannons to destroy the concrete fortifications.84   
The next two months of fighting was concentrated around the trench building of the 
Japanese. These trenches permitted the Japanese to move freely and relatively safe just beyond 
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Russian range. Artillery was shooting constantly at both the attacker and defender. But thanks to the 
solid Russian fortifications and the fact that the Japanese used indirect fire and thus were mostly out 
of range from the Russian canons, neither side could really damage each other’s artillery.85  
The framework of trenches on both sides would slowly 
expand over time and in some cases bring their own line closer to the 
enemy. A whole new type of warfare emerged during this period. 
Japan had hand grenades which volunteers tried to throw into the 
Russian trenches, this however mostly ended with the volunteers 
never coming back. The Russians used a relatively old system of 
wood mortars which could launch explosives further than a man 
could throw, but the Russian explosives were less powerful then the 
Japanese. There are also reports that if the landscape was suitable, 
the Russians would tie explosives to barrels or wheels and send them 
down into the Japanese trenches. Although these explosions wouldn’t cause huge number of 
casualties, is was a strong psychological weapon.86 As Pershing, seeing this trench warfare, would 
describe:” the time that a commander was able to lead a glorious assault is over, what a shame.”87
 After fresh Japanese reinforcements had arrived, Nogi launched his second large scale attack. 
During this second attack on Port Arthur, the Japanese first used their new invention; the trench 
mortar. This new weapon was based on the captured Russian ‘wood mortars’. The Japanese used a 
7-inch version made of steel in comparison to the 5-inch version made of wood. This allowed the 
Japanese to shoot just a bit further with these new trench mortars which were immediately 
produced by the hundreds.88   
In the night before the attack, Japanese engineers crawled out of their trenches to cut the 
barbed wire in front of the Russian positions. They managed to succeed, but not without the 
Russians searchlights spotting them. So, when the Japanese attacked the next day, the Russians knew 
exactly where they would attack and welcomed them with combined machinegun and cannon fire. 
The Japanese had to focus almost all their artillery fire on one area to create a new opening to launch 
their attack. After three waves of infantry attacks, they managed to breach trough the Russian 
trenches. This would lead to almost six hours of hand to hand combat. With fixed bayonets the 
Russians tried to counterattack, and with bayonets fixed the Japanese defended.89 Although the 
bayonet charge was outdated and caused huge number of casualties against the modern defences, 
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Figure 11 Japanese soldiers in a 
trench in the Siege of Port Arthur 
1905 
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both sides would use this tactic till the end of the war and it would still be used in the First World 
War.   
 In the West, the fight for hill 203 was no going so good for the Japanese. Their attack was 
repelled by combined machinegun- and cannon fire. A large-scale artillery bombardment combined 
with naval support fire should change this for the coming second attack. The next day, the Japanese 
believed, that after this huge bombardment, there wouldn’t be much resistance left; “it came as a 
big shock when again the machineguns opened fire and the soldiers were cut down.”90 The artillery 
bombardment combined with naval support again didn’t have the effect they hoped for.   
On the first of October, Nogi’s 11-inch Howitzers had arrived and were ready to open fire. 
These guns had a range of 9000 yard and could fire further than any Russian cannon. The Russian 
concrete fortifications weren’t built to resist fire from these new 11-inch Howitzers, and they 
crumbled under the huge explosions. After a month of immense artillery fire, Nogi launched his third 
major attack. Within three days the Japanese would lose 2100 men and only capture one bunker. 
While the fortifications might have been badly damaged by the new cannons, the Russian defenders 
were still in their trenches and with their machineguns they again stopped the Japanese attack.91 
One-month later, Nogi would be reinforced with a whole new division; around 15 thousand 
fresh soldiers. After a bombardment of artillery and trench mortars combined with hand grenades, 
used by front line soldiers, the Japanese attacked. At first, they managed to breach through the first 
trench line, which was a good sign and many officers believed this was going to be the final battle. 
However, in the afternoon, a daring Russian counterattack based primarily on a wild bayonet charge 
recaptured the forward trenches. At nightfall, the Japanese hadn’t captured any of their objectives. 
Even when outnumbering and outgunning the Russians, it proofed to be difficult to breach trough a 
well-fortified trench line.92   
At night, Nogi asked for volunteers for what he called “a chance for glory.”93Three thousand 
Japanese soldiers volunteered, their goal was to crouch as close as possible to the Russian lines, with 
no equipment other than small knifes, and then quite literary ‘throw themselves’ at them. The 
volunteers were able to quietly get past two lines of barbed wire, and while they were cutting their 
way through the third line they were spotted by a Russian searchlight. Within minutes, Russian 
machine gun fire and an artillery bombardment would mean the loss of 2 thousand Japanese 
soldiers. Nogi’s final assault had cost him 5500 soldiers, whit no ground won.94   
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After this disastrous assault, Kodama was once again sent to Port Arthur, and now 
unofficially took command of the Japanese armies.95 Kodama wouldn’t try another large-scale 
infantry, attack and so Nogi’s chance for glory’ was the last largescale assault on Port Arthur. Kodama 
relied much more on the 11-inch howitzers than Nogi. Kodama focused his attacks on the highest 
mountain in the vicinity of Port Arthur, Hill 203. In one week of fighting, these howitzers used so 
many shells that the top of the hill had shrunk almost 4 meters 
at the end of the battle. On the fifth of December, the 
Japanese would capture the hill for the last time and not lose it 
to the Russian anymore.96   
This Hill 203 made it possible for the Japanese to fire 
upon the remainder of the Russian Far East fleet, which was 
docked in Port Arthur. The continuous shelling of the city from 
hill 203 and the running out of ammunition, medicine and food 
had a big impact on the Russian army. When the Japanese captured one of the Russian bunkers on 
the 28 of January, and a second one on the 31st, Lieutenant General Stoessel surrendered Port 
Arthur; “The Japanese lost almost 92 thousand soldiers in the Siege of Port Arthur, which is 10 
percent of the entire Japanese army. The Russian defenders lost 65 thousand soldiers and the entire 
Far East fleet.”97 One thing that almost all the military observers wrote about the siege was that Port 
Arthur showed the new lethalness of modern war.  
This paragraph shows the brutality of the fighting in the Siege of Port Arthur. It doesn’t just 
show the brutality and modernity of the combat, but it also makes it clear that the Japanese didn’t 
have a real answer to this new way of fighting. By now, both sides had learned the lethality of 
machine guns and artillery, and thus could have known the cost of large-scale infantry attacks. 
However, neither side would let go off their old tactics, and so the bayonet charges would still be 
used throughout the entire siege. The Siege of Port Arthur also clearly shows that from now on 
battles would no longer be won in a day, but instead would last way longer. This would also be the 
case in the First World War.  
The siege of Port Arthur would be the perfect prelude to the type of fighting in the First 
World War. The importance of machine guns, hand grenades, trench mortars, barbed wire and 
artillery is clear to see. Large scale infantry attacks didn’t work anymore in this new form of warfare. 
The Japanese army led by Nogi would at first rely on the large-scale infantry attacks, which resulted 
in huge amounts of casualties, thanks to the modern Russian defences around Port Arthur.  
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 It was only after the German trained general Kodama came to give advice, that Nogi switched 
his tactic and prepared for a long siege. The German trained Kodama understood that the new 
machineguns and artillery made fighting a defensive battle much easier then attacking. He also 
understood that the speed became an important factor of successful assaults. In the end, the 
number of casualties on both sides showed the destructiveness of modern warfare.  
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Chapter 2. The four military observers. 
 
2.1 Military observers 
The last chapter showed that the Russo-Japanese war was similar to the fighting of the First World 
War. This means that it was a good learning opportunity for the First World War. The people who 
had to learn these lessons were the military observers. First, the role of the military observer will be 
discussed. It is necessary to understand who these men were, and why they were present during the 
war Then each paragraph will focus on one of the four chosen military observers who would later go 
on to lead armies in the First World War.   
  Attaching a professional soldier-representative to allied armies in wartime is an age-old 
practice. During the Napoleonic era, this practice gained a new boost of importance. Thanks to the 
many coalitions that were formed against Napoleonic France, there were closer bonds between the 
other European states. The British General Sir Robert Wilson was one of the first European military 
observers to accompany the Russian armies in 1812-1813. Sir Roberts goals and that off all the other 
military observers stayed the same. They were expected to study operations and report home on any 
“lessons learned.”98  
  After the 1850 ’s, the role of military observers expanded. It became more normal for neutral 
countries to send military observers to foreign wars, and it also meant that declining these military 
observers had diplomatic consequences. This resulted in Prussian officers being attached to French 
armies in Mexico and later in Algeria. Russian observers would be attached to both Prussia and 
Austria in their war of 1866. During the American civil war there was a lot of interest from Europe, 
which resulted in seven European countries sending military observers to the United States. During 
the German French war of 1870, the first American observer would be attached to a European army. 
After the Russo-Turkish war of 1877 it became more normal to send observers to much smaller 
conflicts, for example the British-Zulu war.99  
  Next to the fact that these military observers became increasingly professional and more 
accepted as part of warfare, they also became unofficial delegates, who behaved and expected to be 
treated as a diplomatic protocol described. It was not uncommon for the hosting country to pamper 
the foreign observers. This was done to show the prestige off the hosting country. Many of these 
observers were promising young attachés, who hoped that these experiences of war would boost 
their career. These young officers came in contact, and sometimes even became friends, with other 
observers who often had similar goals and interests. For example, during the Russo-Japanese war, 
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the German observer Max Hoffman became close friends with the American observer, who taught 
him English.100 The military observers, who would often go on to rise through the ranks of the 
military, became a small group of elites who all knew each other. Especially during the First World 
War, most generals had or had been in contact with generals who were now their enemies. This can 
be seen in the following quote from Hamilton while he was commanding his troops in the Gallipoli 
campaign: “What would my friends on the Japanese General Staff say—or my quondam friends on 
the German General Staff—if they knew that a Commander-in-Chief hadn’t been for a fortnight in 
touch with his troops.”101  
  Western military observers were almost always permitted to follow the armies of countries 
at war. However, it is important to keep in mind that they were accepted to participate, but not 
asked to participate. They would and could learn only as much as the ‘parent’, the leading general, 
would let them see. This meant that good relationships with the ‘parent’ generals was important 
because they decided how close to a battle the observers were permitted to go.   
  Especially during the Russo-Japanese war, this would often lead to big discussions and 
tensions. The American observer Pershing would intentionally write to his president that his time 
with the Japanese army was wasted because he was not allowed to see anything up close. The fact 
he had never written a personal letter to his president before or that he didn’t have the correct 
address didn’t matter, because he fully intended the Japanese to intercept and read the letter. Which 
is exactly what happened, and Pershing was permitted to get a lot closer to the fighting in the next 
battle.102 There is also the story that Max Hoffman completely broke protocol when he was denied 
watching a battle from a hilltop. He proceeded to have a racist outburst in which he yelled: “that the 
Japanese general was nothing more than a yellow-skinned monkey, who had no right to talk to a 
German officer in this way.”103 Interestingly enough, he was later on allowed to watch from the hill.
 For the Japanese, these military observers were important. The leaders of Japan wanted to 
be seen as an equally great power and not as a lesser Asian country. The fact that all these Western 
military observers wanted to join their armies was a big diplomatic boost for Japan. This showed that 
the Japanese had a ‘Western styled army’ that the other Western powers believed was worthy of 
following.   
  The introduction showed that this chapter will focus on four Western military observers. The 
American John Pershing, the British Sir Ian Hamilton, the German Max Hoffman and the Italian Enrico 
Caviglia. All four of these observers have met each other in their time with the Japanese army. 
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However, they weren’t together for the whole duration of the war. For example, Hamilton left 
Manchuria before the end of the war, while Pershing would arrive only four months after the war 
had started. They also didn’t necessarily saw the same battles. Caviglia started as an observer of the 
first Japanese army of Oyama, while Hoffman arrived in Manchuria with the second Japanese army 
under Nogi. However, during the six months of fighting around Port Arthur, all of them visited this 
battlefield at some point. Even when the observers weren’t actually at Port Arthur, they did receive 
news of it. The fate of Port Arthur was important to the rest of the Japanese armies fighting in 
Manchuria because it decided their whole strategy. So, if a Western observer wasn’t present at Port 
Arthur, they would receive the news first-hand from their Japanese counterparts.  
 
2.2 John J. Pershing 
The first military observer that will be discussed is the American John 
Pershing. Born in 1860, he finished his military education at West 
Point in 1886. Soon he fought in his first war against the Apache 
Indians. A couple of years later, he would fight in the Spanish-
American war of 1898 and one year later in the Filipino-American war 
of 1899. In 1904-1905 he was sent to Japan as a military observer.104
 Pershing was sent to Japan by the American General staff. This 
is also the audience for which he wrote his reports on the Russo-
Japanese war. For Pershing, it is important to know that just before he 
was sent to Japan, he was married and personally didn’t want to go to Japan; “I hope this bloody war 
will end soon. I am just about as forlorn as I can be.”105  
  His first reports on the Japanese army show that he wasn’t as impressed with the Japanese 
as the other military observers were; “the Japanese are tough, eager, disciplined, and not afraid to 
die.”106 Thanks to this, some of the other military observers believed the Japanese were the best 
soldiers in the world; “I know for a fact that the American soldiers are the best, the best material if 
well trained.”107 His lack of respect for the Japanese was partly based on a form of racism, but also on 
personal believes that Japan might cause trouble in the future; “The white race made a mistake in 
permitting the Japanese-Russo war. While today there may not be even a remote intention on the 
part of Japan to acquire the Philippine islands there is no telling as to when in Japans rise to power 
she may regard it as her … manifest destiny.”108 
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 In a personal letter to a friend Pershing lists exactly what he believed was important in the 
Russo-Japanese war. For example, he writes about the importance of frontline communications in 
the form of telegraph. As the armies get bigger, communication becomes more and more important. 
His view on the ‘modern’ trench war that was taking place around Port Arthur is also clear for he 
writes; ”the day for officers to rush forward in the firing line waving their hats and yelling ‘come on 
boys’ is in this new warfare a thing of the past.”109  
  He also learned the usefulness of the new artillery cannons.110 These really became his most 
important lesson of the war. Until now, Pershing had fought Indians, the Spanish and the Filipinos. All 
of these wars were fought in an old fashion manner. He would ride with his cavalry unit and charge 
the enemy with sword and pistol. Cannons were almost never used in these wars and definitely not 
on a scale like in the Russo-Japanese war.  
  Pershing also got acquainted with the modern machineguns. He however didn’t believe in 
their use during the offensive. He was much more in favour of using artillery. He says: “To much 
reliance on machineguns is dangerous. Artillery can do about all machineguns can do.”111 None of 
these lessons were the most important to Pershing. As can be read in his official reports to the 
American General staff where he says: “again and again I see what is most important in this modern 
war, preparedness. Lack of preparedness can never be remedied when the war is started.”112 Here he 
talks about the Russian lack of preparedness and he thus believes this is one of the main reasons that 
Japan was able to beat the Russians.   
 In 1914, Pershing would lead the ‘Pancho Villa-expedition’ into Mexico. After the United 
States of America declared war on Germany and joined the First World War in 1917, Pershing was 
promoted to Commander in Chief of the American forces. He would build the American army that in 
1917 consisted of 27 thousand soldiers into a force of 2 million strong. While training the first big 
American army, he relied heavily on his lessons from the Russo-Japanese war.113 
 The American soldier was often trained almost twice as long as his British or German 
counterparts during the First World War. This was primarily the result of Perishing’s interaction with 
the well-trained Japanese soldiers and the credit they received from the other military observers; “I 
know for a fact that the American soldiers are the best, the best material if well trained.”114 This 
already mentioned quote says is it all. Pershing believed the American soldier was the best in the 
world, if trained well or just as well as the Japanese soldiers.     
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 Pershing’s need for preparedness didn’t stop 
there, every large American assault in France would 
only be ordered after a detailed scale of the battlefield 
was made so that it could be studied thoroughly.115 
Another great example of his preparedness can be 
found in the soldiers’ helmets. Just before the 
American soldiers would fight in France, the United 
Kingdom invented steel helmets that would offer much 
more protection than the caps they had worn before. 
For Pershing this was also a new invention, but before 
his troops would be sent into the trenches, he made sure that every single one of them would get 
these new helmets.116   
 During his time around Port Arthur, Pershing had seen the new trench warfare and he 
believed this way of fighting was “pointless and too costly.”117 Unlike most of his allied generals 
Pershing knew that large scale infantry attacks would do little, and bring huge amounts of casualties. 
That’s why he builds up one of the biggest artillery units of the war. Pershing believed that artillery 
would prove decisive. He had some initial success, based on speed and overwhelming artillery 
bombardments.   
 However, in the battle of the Meuse-Argonne in 1917, it became clear that Pershing made 
one big misjudgement. The machinegun proved to be much more important than he believed it 
would be when he was in Japan. Especially, the fact that the machinegun proved useful while on the 
offensive was a big misjudgement by Pershing. It wouldn’t take long for Pershing to realise this 
mistake and he immediately started buying French machineguns. These were the same French 
machineguns the Japanese army had successfully used while attacking, which in 1905 Pershing 
wasn’t impressed by.118  
 Still the American casualties rose, and Pershing knew that even with these new machineguns 
he would still be fighting the trench warfare that he so despised. His answer to this was tanks. The 
tank wasn’t a new American invention during the First World War since the British and French had 
already been using them since 1915. However, Pershing changed the role of the tank. Based on his 
experiences during the Russo-Japanese war, he believed that large scale infantry attacks were 
useless, because the soldiers were unprotected.119 During the battle of Saint-Mihiel, which was won 
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by the Americans, he would order his tanks to form the first 
and third attack wave supported by infantry. The infantry 
could thus find cover behind and between the tanks. Until 
now, tanks hadn’t been used in such a large amount in a 
small area.120  
 The well-trained American army led by Pershing 
played a decisive role in the Allied victory during the First 
World War. In 1920, Pershing would be promoted to the highest military rank of the United States of 
America: General of the armies. He would go on to mentor a couple of famous American generals, 
for example: Dwight D. Eisenhower, George Patton and Omar Bradly. At the start of World War Two, 
Pershing was a big supporter of US aid for the allies against German aggression. It is said that before 
D-Day, Pershing was still in contact with his ‘pupils’, which are listed above. Pershing died in 1948 
and was buried in Arlington National Cemetery.        
 To conclude this paragraph, the quote of his friend and later writer of his biography Frederick 
Palmer perfectly sums up the importance of the Russo-Japanese war for John Pershing: “He had gone 
to Manchuria an accomplished small-unit leader, a master of light tactics; he came out skilled in the 
management of mass.”121 Before the Russo-Japanese war, Pershing had led cavalry unites and never 
commanded an army larger than a couple of thousand soldiers strong. His time as military observer 
with the Japanese army showed him how to command armies of more than half a million soldiers in 
the modern way of war. His time as a military observer played a big role in his great performance as 
General of the American Armies in France. 
2.3 Ian Hamilton  
The second military observer is the British Sir Ian Hamilton. 
Hamilton was born in 1853 and joined the Royal military college in 
1870. He would fight in the Afghan campaign in 1872, and in the 
First Boer War of 1880. Here he was recommended for the Victoria 
Cross and he was invited to meet Queen Victoria herself. He would 
go on to lead soldiers in the Nile expedition in 1884, Burma in 
1886, Bengal in 1890, India in 1895-1898 and the Tirah campaign of 
1898. In 1899, the second Boer War broke out and Hamilton was 
invited to join the famous Lord Kitchener as his Chief of staff. 
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During the Second Boer War, Hamilton also got acquainted with a young war correspondent named 
Winston Churchill.122  
Hamilton would stay in South Africa till 1903, after which he would return to India as 
lieutenant general. In 1904, Hamilton would go to Japan under the name of Military attaché of the 
British Indian army. It was Hamilton himself who decided he wanted to go to Japan, as he was 
curious how the Japanese army would fair against the Russians. During his time as a military 
observer, Hamilton kept a diary which was later published as: “a staff-officers scrapbook during the 
Russo-Japanese war.” This ‘scrapbook’ wasn’t meant for the English General staff. It was mainly a 
diary for Hamilton himself, which makes it an interesting book and also a honest one.123  
The fact that Hamilton was with the Japanese army on his own accord immediately shows his 
intentions for being there. He wasn’t there to learn anything from the Japanese and certainly not 
from the Russians, who he disliked. He was mainly present because of his own curiosity about this 
new ‘UK of Asia’. In his diary it is also obvious that he gained respect and a form of admiration for the 
Japanese as the war progressed. At first, you can read that he didn’t think highly of them, which is 
probably based on a form of racism.124   
In his book Hamilton also keeps referring to the first and second Boer War. For example: 
“The Japanese do not shoot like the Boers, or else there would have been few of them left.”125 In 
Hamilton’s mind he had already fought in a ‘modern war’, and now nothing that he saw in the Russo-
Japanese war was new for him. Instead, he kept focusing on lessons the Japanese or the Russians 
could have learned from the Boers; “Why did the Russian great General staff disdain to take a lesson 
from the Boer.”126 “The Boers, it must be allowed, would have been invisible, whereas the Russians 
were plainly to be seen, not only by the infantry of the attack, but also by its artillery, which makes a 
considerable difference.”127  
The last telling aspect of Hamilton’s diary is that in the whole book the machinegun isn’t 
mentioned once. He does however mention artillery guns quite a lot. Which could lead to the 
conclusion that Hamilton shared Pershing vision; “To much reliance on machineguns is dangerous. 
Artillery can do about all machineguns can do.”128 He did however see the use in unconventional 
tactics such as night attacks and that cavalry would have no role in this ‘Modern war’.129 For 
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Hamilton, there was one bigger lesson that he believed the Russo-Japanese war had showed him, 
namely: “superior morale is all that is needed to breach a defensive position.”130  
At the start of the First World War, Hamilton was appointed as Commander in chief of the UK 
Home army, this meant that Hamilton was responsible for protecting the UK from any German 
invasion. In March 1915, Hamilton was appointed by his former Chief, 
and now Field Marshal, Lord Kitchener as Commander of the Allied 
Mediterranean expeditionary Force. The objective for the now 62-
year-old Hamilton was to capture the Dardanelles and then push 
onward to Constantinople, the Capitol of the Ottoman Empire. The 
plan for the Gallipoli invasion was invented by Hamilton’s friend, First 
Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill. Churchill and Kitchener 
together made sure that Hamilton would lead this expedition.131   
It must be said that in the formation of the plan for the Gallipoli invasion, Hamilton played no 
role at all. He was sent to Gallipoli to command his troops and follow the plan. His troops had no 
training in seaborne operations, Hamilton had no special landing crafts and he was not given any 
information about the landscape. Therefore the disastrous landings of the Gallipoli Campaign won’t 
be discussed here, for it can be argued that there was little that 
Hamilton could do or was allowed to do.132  
  After the first week of the landing operations, the real trench 
warfare in Gallipoli started. This war on the Gallipoli peninsula lasted 
almost a year after, which the British would retreat from the island. 
Both sides would rely on endless infantry assaults on well defended 
trench lines with little result. After a year of fighting, the British had 
made almost no real progress and the Ottomans hadn’t retaken any ground from the invaders. Both 
sides lost approximately 250 thousand soldiers in the year of fighting.133 Hamilton wouldn’t 
command this retreat from the island because he was relieved of his command in October 1915. The 
main reason for Hamilton being released from command wasn’t the fact that the campaign had 
made little progress but the fact that Hamilton didn’t want to even discuss the possibility of retreat. 
He agreed with Lord Kitchener that “a retreat would be the most disastrous event in the whole 
history of the British empire.”134   
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As can be seen in the actions and plans undertaken by Hamilton during his time as the 
commander in chief of the Gallipoli campaign, he was relying heavily on his former war experience. 
In particular, his war experience from Africa and India, where the English were able to defeat large 
groups of ‘indigenous’ troops while being greatly outnumbered. The 
Zulu War, where Hamilton really made a name for himself, is a good 
example of this. However, in this new modern way of war everything 
was very different, which Hamilton realised far too late. His time 
spend with the Japanese army could have, and maybe even should 
have, prepared him for this ‘modern war’.135    
 This paragraph shows that Hamilton was in Manchuria on his 
own accord but not with the objective to learn from the Japanese. 
This might be a reason as to why he repeated some mistakes from the Japanese, for example the 
reliance on naval bombardment, which in Gallipoli again proved to do little against the well dug 
trenches and other defences. Hamilton’s believe in the use of large-scale infantry attacks hadn’t 
changed during his time in Manchuria and would prove disastrous in Gallipoli. Almost till the end of 
his time in Gallipoli, Hamilton believed that; “superior morale is all that is needed to breach a 
defensive position.”136 This might be a reason as to why Hamilton kept ordering large scale infantry 
attacks against trenches with barbed wire.       
 There are more examples of lessons not learned by Hamilton. Especially in the Siege of Port 
Arthur, Hamilton could have seen that modern battles, where the enemy had prepared defensive 
positions, would last way longer than before. However, in the initial plan of the Gallipoli invasion, 
Hamilton believed he could conquer Constantinople, current day Istanbul, within a month.   
The things Hamilton was personally interested in were for example the Japanese trench 
mortars and hand grenades. These would play a big role in the Gallipoli campaign and Hamilton had 
personally requested them from the British high command. He also put a lot of importance on 
camouflage. In his notebook from his time in Manchuria he often makes remarks stating that 
camouflage was important in this ‘new kind of war’. When the British forces had landed in Gallipoli 
and trenches were built, Hamilton did indeed order his troops to use camouflage. In some cases, he 
even ordered new helmets to be covered with sand to make them stand out less. So, there is some 
real evidence that Hamilton did learn some things from his time with the Japanese army. 137The 
biggest mistake, or lesson not learned by Hamilton, was the prejudice for non-European troops. An 
important aspect of the Russo-Japanese war was the fact that an Asian country would defeat a 
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European country for the first time. This was proof that Asian soldiers could be just as good or even 
better then European soldiers. When Hamilton was sent to lead the Gallipoli invasion against the 
Ottomans, he didn’t take this lesson into account. A racist based idea would stay with Hamilton 
during the campaign that a Anzac soldiers was always better than “those damned Turks.”138 Even 
though Hamilton had seen the Japanese army being trained by German officers and knew that the 
Germans were now training the Ottoman soldiers, he didn’t make the connection that perhaps these 
‘inferior’ troops might prove quite a challenge.   
Hamilton ended his military career right after being recalled from Gallipoli. He would spend 
most of his time leading an ex-service men organization called the British legion. He was also 
founding member and vice-president of the Anglo-German association, founded in 1928, with the 
goal of forging links between Germany and the United Kingdom. He was still vice-president of this 
organization when Adolf Hitler rose to power in Germany. Hamilton described himself as a “admirer 
of the great Adolph.”139 Hamilton would also remain a strong supporter of British Imperial power 
until his death in 1947.  
 
2.4 Max Hoffman 
The third military observer that will be researched is the German 
Max Hoffman. Born in 1869, he joined the army in 1887. In 1898, he 
went to the Prussian War Academy, which was arguably the best 
military academy of its time. Two years later, Hoffman would join 
the German General staff. In 1901, he was sent to Russia by the 
General staff to learn the Russian language. In 1904, he was sent 
again on a mission by the German General staff, this time to 
Japan.140       
 Although Hoffman was sent to Japan by the German General 
staff, his main goal wasn’t to learn about this ‘new modern war’. The 
German General staff believed they couldn’t learn new military 
lessons from this ‘modern war’, which they didn’t already know. The main objective of Hoffman was 
to find out everything he could about the Russian strengths and weaknesses. His whole military 
career was built around the notion that sooner or later Germany would fight a war with Russia, and 
that Hoffman would lead armies on this Eastern front. This is also the main reason that Hoffman had 
to learn the Russian language.141       
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 However, most of his lessons about the Russian weaknesses and strengths weren’t very 
useful in the First World War, as can be read in the next quote from Hoffman; “The mistakes they 
(the Russians) had made when opposed to the Japanese they did not repeat in the campaign against 
us. Sadly, for then the struggle would have been much easier for us.”142 These lessons on the Russian 
side are mostly credited to the efforts of General Rennenkampf, who didn’t distinguish himself in 
Manchuria. However, after the war he would invest most of his time in completely overthrowing the 
Russian army model. No longer would the Russian army be based on a small elite force of soldiers 
with millions of poorly trained reserve soldiers who could be mobilized if necessary. Instead, the 
Russian army would mirror the French system where every couple of years these reserve soldiers 
would have mandatory exercises. Rennenkampf also wrote a new regulation handbook for every 
Russian soldier, based on what he learned from the Russo-Japanese war. This hard work of 
Rennenkampf really undermined the results of Hoffman’s time in Manchuria.143  
 Luckily for Hoffman, learning about the Russians wasn’t his only objective. He was also sent 
to Japan to see how well the German trained and styled army would fight. Chapter one showed that 
the Japanese army was trained by the German officer Meckel. At first, Hoffman was really impressed 
by how well the Japanese army was doing. After the first two great battels, he reports: “the Japanese 
are justified in the trust they had placed in our military system.”144 However, when visiting the Siege 
of Port Arthur, Hoffman became less excited. Meckel, who had trained the Japanese army, strongly 
believed that every battle could be won with a sudden large-scale infantry attack. These attacks were 
repeatedly tried by General Nogi in the Siege of Port Arthur, much to the distress of Hoffman. 
Hoffman didn’t understand why the Japanese general didn’t try something else but kept attacking in 
the same way. It wouldn’t take long for Hoffman to find out where the problem lay. Right after the 
war, he met with Japanese General Fuji, the chairman of the Japanese general staff. When Hoffman 
said that: ”he was anxious to find out what changes in the Japanese Regulations would be introduced 
owing to their experiences in the War.” Fuji replied with: “So am I. We will wait to see what new 
Regulations for the Service Germany will issue on the basis of the reports that the officers who have 
been sent here will make, and we will translate these Regulations as we did the former ones.”145 The 
problem can clearly be seen from these quotes. The Japanese officers didn’t learn any lessons on 
their own, but blindly followed the German manual for war.      
 This was an important lesson learned by Hoffman, which would directly influence the First 
World War. The German army wasn’t only training the Japanese army, it was also involved in training 
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the Ottoman army, which would later be an ally of Germany in World War One. In 1913, the 
possibility of an Ottoman-Russian war was higher than ever. This resulted in an intensifying of the 
German training the Ottoman army. German General Otto von Sanders was sent to the Ottoman 
empire, where he would train and, after the Ottomans joined the war, also lead troops. It was Von 
Sanders who trained and later ordered General Mustafa Kemal, now known as Ataturk, to counter 
the Gallipoli invasion. The Gallipoli invasion was, of course, led by the British Sir Ian Hamilton. 
However, the allied forces had gravely underestimated the military organisation and power of the 
Ottoman empire, which thanks to the German military mission had improved immensely in just two 
years. This result was made possible by the lessons Hoffman learned in Japan about the real effects 
of German military training on the battlefield.146       
 This wasn’t the most important lesson that Hoffman had learned from his time with the 
Japanese army. In 1914, Germany and Russia were at war with each other. Germany planned and 
hoped for a quick victory in France, after which it could focus on the 
big Russian threat. Hoffman was a commanding officer off the 8th 
German army. This was the only German army located at the Russian 
border in 1914. The Russians attacked much sooner than the 
Germans had anticipated, and in the beginning the Germans were 
almost pushed out of East Prussia. Hoffman came up with a daring 
plan to rush forward and attack the First Russian army in the hope 
that the Second Russian army wouldn’t be able to aid in time. 
However, his commanding officer Maximilian von Prittwitz disliked 
the plan. The same week, commanding officer of the German 8th army 
von Prittwitz was replaced by Paul von Hindenburg and Eric Ludendorff. Ludendorff and Hoffman had 
been neighbours for almost 10 years prior to the war and knew each other well. The moment 
Hindenburg and Ludendorff arrived at the front, Hoffman was invited by Ludendorff to explain the 
situation.147     
 The Eastern front wasn’t looking good for the Germans because the First and Second Russian 
army, also called the Vilna and Warsaw army, were about to encircle the Germans. Both the First and 
the Second Russian armies were larger than the German 8th army. However, the three German 
generals; Hindenburg, Ludendorff and Hoffman came up with an even more detailed plan. They 
would rush forward and encircle the First Russian army. This was a risky move, for if the second 
Russian army would find out the First army was being attacked, it would of course move in to aid 
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their countrymen. This risky gamble worked, and the Germans successfully attacked and destroyed 
the First Russian army at the battle of Tannenberg. After this victory, the Germans immediately 
moved to attack the Second Russian army which was defeated a couple of weeks later.148 There is 
still a debate about who really deserves the credit for the victory at Tannenberg. In 1920, while 
touring the fields of Tannenberg with his cadets, Hoffman would say: "See—this is where Hindenburg 
slept before the battle, this is where Hindenburg slept after the battle, and between you and me this 
is where Hindenburg slept during the battle.”149       
 Although there is a debate of who made the plans, it was Hoffman who made the great 
victory in the Battle of Tannenberg possible. The First Russian army was led by Alexander Samsonov 
and the Second Russian army was led by Paul von Rennenkampf. In Hoffman’s time with the 
Japanese army, he focused more on the Russians then on the Japanese. Thanks to this, he found out 
that in Manchuria Samsonov and Rennenkampf had a big falling out. Samsonov was at the time 
commander of a Cossack division, and in the battle of Liauyang he was forced to evacuate, leaving 
some of his soldiers behind because his left flank was unprotected. Rennenkampf was supposed to 
secure this left flank, but his orders hadn’t moved forward.150 Based on this information, Hoffman 
was sure that Rennenkampf wouldn’t move in to aid Samsonov’s First army. “I would have risked 
everything, for I was sure that Rennenkampf would not go assist Samsonov for personal enmity 
against him.”151           
 After the battle of Tannenberg, Hoffman would lead the German Eastern front together with 
Hindenburg and Ludendorff, until Hindenburg and Ludendorff would move to the Western front. At 
the same time, Hoffman was promoted to major general and would become part of the General staff 
of Prince Leopold of Bavaria. Together with Prince Leopold Hoffman commanded the entire Eastern 
front of the central powers, the German troops, but also the Austro-
Hungarian troops as well as the Bulgarian troops.  
 In 1917, Hoffman would also be present in the peace 
negotiations with the Soviet Union. In his memoir, Leon Trotsky 
wrote that: “General Hoffmann was the only element of serious 
reality in these negotiations.”152 It was Hoffman’s idea to only take a 
part of Poland and create a couple of new subject states in the East. 
With this, Hoffman went directly against most of the other German 
generals who wanted all of Poland. In the end, the German Kaiser favoured Hoffman’s plan, which 
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led to a big clash with General Ludendorff, who claimed Hoffman’s Jewish wife was the reason for 
this idea. Hoffman was never sent to the Western front, as the German high command demanded, 
because the Kaiser believed “his experiences with the Russians were too valuable to waste.”153 
Hoffman would survive the First world War and remained in the German army until 1920. A year 
later, he teamed up with important German industrialists to campaign for the Western powers to 
join together and overthrow the Soviet Union. He died in 1927.  
To conclude Hoffman’s time as a military observer with the Japanese army had played a big 
role in his career as a German major general and it played a big role in the First World War. At first, 
Hoffman’s goals seemed to be unsuccessful. He had learned every weakness of the Russian army 
during the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905. However, the Russians themselves had also learned a 
lot and most of the important weaknesses were dealt with, primarily thanks to the Russian General 
Rennenkampf. Nonetheless, Hoffman did find out something else while he was in Japan, namely, as 
he put it: “The German way of war is once again successful.” The German training of the Japanese 
army was successful, but also had some problems. The fact that the Japanese blindly followed the 
war manuals written by the Germans and didn’t improvise was something the Germans hadn’t 
thought of yet. When Otto von Sanders would go on to train the Ottoman army in 1913, he had new 
instructions which were the result of Hoffman’s critique.   
The most important aspect of Hoffman’s career during World War One remains the victory in 
the battle of Tannenberg. The German army was badly outnumbered, and victory seemed 
impossible. Thanks to the information provided by Hoffman, that the Russian generals disliked each 
other and wouldn’t be too keen to aid each other, a daring plan was constructed. In the end, 
Hoffman’s assumptions proved to be correct and the Russian General Rennenkampf didn’t move to 
aid his fellow Russian General Samsonov. This resulted in the victory at Tannenberg, which saved the 
German Eastern front.  
 
 
153 M. Hoffman, the war of lost opportunities. 112 
 
41 
2.5 Enrico Caviglia. 
Enrico Caviglia was born in 1862, making him the youngest of the four 
military observers. He entered the army on the age of fifteen in 1877. In 
1885 he was promoted to lieutenant and in 1888 he would volunteer for 
the ‘Royal Italian Colonial Army’ in Eritrea. Here he would lead a small gun 
battery in multiple expeditions. Three years later, Caviglia would return to 
Italy and enter the General staff school.154    
 Right after his graduation, he was once again sent to Africa and he 
was also present in the lost Battle of Adwa in 1896. This was one of the 
biggest defeats of the Italian army in Africa and all officers present during 
this battle were inquired by a military tribunal. Caviglia was cleared of any blame for he was not 
directly involved in the battle. A lot of other Italian officers weren’t so lucky, which meant that 
Caviglia rose through the ranks at rapid speed. In 1903 he was promoted to major and a year later 
Caviglia would be sent to Japan to “study the Japanese operations against the Russians.”155  
Caviglia was thus sent by the Italian high command to study the Russo-Japanese war. The 
main difference between Caviglia and the other three military observers was that for Caviglia the 
Russo-Japanese war was the first ‘Western styled’ war he experienced. After his time with the 
Japanese army, Caviglia would spend a year in Libya, where he would deal with some rebel tribes but 
not experience the Italian-Ottoman war.156  
On the 24th of May 1915, Italy joined the First World 
War against the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the German 
Empire. Caviglia was directly promoted to brigadier general and 
was sent to the front lines near Karts Plateau. As brigadier 
general, Caviglia commanded some four thousand troops. 
However, he was to follow every order from high command to 
the letter. There was no room for what the Germans called 
‘auftragstacktiek’ in the Italian army of the First World War. In the first battle on the Isonzo front, 
Caviglia was ordered to attack the enemy trench head on, Caviglia disagreed but had to obey his 
orders and would lose almost 70 percent of his men.157  
On the Karts Plateau, Caviglia would fight until June 1916. Again, and again he had to follow 
orders with which he disagreed. The Italian commander in chief Luigi Cadorna took little notice to the 
objections of a brigadier general. This was further aided by the fact that Caviglia had a bitter rivalry 
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with another brigadier general, Pietro Badogolio. Badogolio, unlike Caviglia, tried hard to get on the 
good side of Cadorna and thus never criticised his tactics. At the start of 1917, both rivals were 
promoted to major general.158  
In 1917, Caviglia became evermore upset with the tactics used by Cardona. In his memoirs he 
would write: “the Italian tactics in that period were so predictable that the Austrians knew each time 
with adequate notice when and where the enemy offensive would be and were ready to repel it.”159 
This would lead to his actions in the 11th Isonzo battle. Here there were three Italian attacks and 
Caviglia would lead the left attack.  
Caviglia made a brave decision and would not follow Cadorna’s instructions. Caviglia had 
always known that frontal assaults were useless and this time he would focus on manoeuvre, “just as 
the Japanese did.”160 Caviglia used his knowledge gained from the battle of the Yalu river during the 
Russo-Japanese war. Here, Japanese soldiers used pontoons and floating bridges spearheaded by 
men in boats to cross the river. Caviglia used the night to cover his preparations and when the 
Austrian troops saw the Italians land the next morning, it was too late. Within three days, Caviglia 
had reached every single goal of his left-wing attack. Cadorna was impressed but failed to follow up 
the breach. Caviglia made spectacular progress but was forced to retreat because the Italian army 
wasn’t prepared for so much progress in such a little time period.161  
Not long after this battle, the Austro-Hungarian forces would retake the initiative. The 
Russians civil war had broken out, and now there was no longer an Eastern front, which meant that 
new troops would arrive to fight the Italians. German ‘sturmtruppen’ would reinforce the Austrians. 
A young officer named Erwin Rommel would make exceptional progress with his ‘sturmtruppen’ and 
large artillery bombardments. In the Battle of Caporetto, the entire second Italian army was 
destroyed. Most of its soldiers were taken prisoner because they became encircled thanks to the 
speed of the German ‘sturmtruppen’. There was just one army core which made it out fairly intact; 
the one led by Caviglia.162   
Caviglia saw the attack coming and was the only Italian general to respond quickly and 
adequate. He knew of the importance of speed in the German trained Japanese army. So, when he 
found out that there were now German reinforcements present, he made sure his flanks were 
prepared so that he would not get encircled. Caviglia also tried to get the other army corpses to 
make the same preparations, but again no one listened to his advice.163   
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During his retreat, Caviglia sent messengers to the British army because there was no longer 
an Italian army in the area. The British responded and sent troops to help Caviglia defend his new 
position along the Piave river. Here, Caviglia and his British reinforcements would halt the Austrian 
army for almost a week, in which time new Italian reinforcements could arrive to take up defensive 
positions. If it were not for Caviglia and the British aid, the whole sector would have been breached, 
which could have meant the end of the war for Italy.164 Caviglia was awarded the Silver Medal of 
Military valour. After the war, King George the 5th would make him Knight Commander of the Order 
of the Bath, thus making him a British Sir.165  
However, the war wasn’t over yet. And although Caviglia was able to halt the Austro-
Hungarian advance, Italy was in a bad shape. The battle of Caporetto meant the loss of 320 thousand 
Italian soldiers, 3150 guns and 3 thousand machineguns. Cadorna was court marshalled and replaced 
by Armando Diaz as Commander in Chief. Caviglia’s rival Badoglio became Diaz, new chief of staff, 
which meant that Caviglia instantly disliked Diaz as much as he had Cadorna. This is one of the 
reasons that Caviglia and his new 10th corps were to stay at the Piave river with British 
reinforcements. Here, Caviglia would defend the river until June 1918.166  
The new Commander in Chief Diaz had no real problem with Caviglia, he saw his strategic 
skills and his good relations with the British. Therefore, Caviglia was promoted to lead the entire 8th 
Italian army in the coming offensive. This would be the first time that Caviglia was able to make his 
own offensive plan as commander. He would focus on speed and manoeuvre as he had always 
wanted to do since the beginning of the war. Again, he would need to cross a river to attack, and 
again, he would use his knowledge from the battle of the Yalu river from 1904. He would use 
pontoons and floating bridges and attacked at night to use the dark as cover. His left flank would 
consist of his British allies, with who he was now fighting for over more than a year. His centre 
crossed the river, guarded by immense artillery fire.167  
On the 24th of October, the first Italian soldiers 
landed across the river Piave and the battle of Vittorio 
Veneto would start. Caviglia ordered his soldiers to not 
only move forward but also left and right to cover the 
still river crossing soldiers, which was also something he 
had learned from the Japanese. Once his army was 
across, Caviglia made a very bold decision. He would not 
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occupy enemy trenches and prepare for a counterattack like the Japanese had so skilfully done 
during the Russo-Japanese war. Instead, he encouraged his men to keep moving forward and to 
destroy the enemy artillery. In the end, the Italian Army would lose 40 thousand soldiers, while the 
Austro-Hungarians had 80 thousand casualties and 450 thousand soldiers were captured.168   
On the 3rd of November, just a week after the start of Caviglia’s offensive, the Austro-
Hungarian army was broken and Trieste was taken, the same day the armistice of Villa Giusti was 
signed. Caviglia was named as just one of the architects of the victory. Diaz and Badoglio also 
received much of the honour. Some of the Italian General staff, quite possibly Badoglio, would even 
say it was the British Lord Cavan, who command Caviglia’s left flank, who made the whole plan.169 In 
the United Kingdom however, Caviglia s leadership was undisputed and he and Lord Cavan would 
keep in contact for many years. This bond between Lord Cavan and Caviglia can be seen very clearly 
in a letter from lord Cavan to the British high command after the victory at Vittorio Veneto: “During 
the Battle, I was in constant touch with his Excellency, General Caviglia, under whose general 
direction my Army was operating. He was always most kind and prompt in assistance and advice, and 
I owe him very warm thanks for his generous encouragements.”170  
Later in life Caviglia, would become a strong opponent of Mussolini and his Fascist regime. At 
the age of 81 he took control of the Italian military in Rome and negotiated with the German General 
Kesselring about Rome status of an ‘open city’. If it wasn’t for the old general, the Germans troops 
might not have left Rome, which would have resulted in a battle in the city, with all the damage that 
comes from it.171 After this last act, Caviglia would spent the rest of his days in his villa which was 
called ‘villa Vittorio Veneto’. He died in 1945, leaving behind a diary in which he had written his 
critique on the Fascist party and that he “didn’t recognize his beloved Italy anymore.”172   
To conclude the story of the Italian military observer Enrico Caviglia is by far the most 
interesting one. He was sent to Japan as a young, in-experienced officer who tried to learn as much 
as possible from his first ‘big Western war’. However, it would take until 1916 before any of these 
experiences could be used. From day one, Caviglia knew that the large-scale infantry attacks were 
useless, yet no one listened. It was until Caviglia decided to go against his orders, that he could show 
his strategic capabilities. However, after this big victory at the 11th battle of Isonzo, nothing changed. 
When Caviglia found out that they were facing German reinforcements, he took the 
necessary preparations to counter their speed based encircle movements, which he had learned 
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from the German trained Japanese army. He had also warned the other Italian generals, but again he 
wasn’t listened to. Only after Caviglia’s army core would be left to fight for themselves at the Piave 
river, he could really show his capabilities. It can be debated that Caviglia, together with his British 
reinforcements, saved the war for Italy when he stopped the Austro-Hungarian advance three times 
at the Piava river.   
Only after this success did his superiors take notice of his military knowledge and experience. 
Finally, Caviglia was given command of the 8th Italian army to lead the October offensive. Together 
with the British at his left flank he would cross the Piave river, based on tactics he saw being used by 
the Japanese in the Battle of the Yalu river in 1904. This battle would become known as Vittorio 
Veneto, which would lead to the end of the war a week later.  
 
2.6 The lessons.  
The four military observers who have been discussed in this chapter are of course four of many more 
military observers from the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. It is difficult to say, based only on 
these four military observers, if and which lessons were learned by the army’s General staffs in the 
prelude to World War One. However, these four military observers weren’t just observers, they 
would actively participate in World War One where their knowledge and lessons from the Russo-
Japanese war played a role in their decision making while commanding armies. This paragraph will go 
a step further then the last four paragraphs. Here the most important lessons of the Western military 
observers will be discussed, and it will be debated if the lessons had a direct impact on the outcome 
of the First World War.           
 For the military observer John Pershing, it is not very difficult to define the lessons learned 
from the Russo-Japanese war, thanks to his personal letter in which he describes what he found 
important while in Manchuria. Here it became clear that Pershing believed that the new forms of 
communication, such as telegraphs, were important, because the armies were much larger than 
before. Pershing full heartily believed that artillery would decide the victor of the next war and so he 
pushed for the creation of a huge artillery army, which was an important strength for the American 
army during the whole First World War. This combined with his believe that preparedness in war was 
the most important aspect, resulted in a very well-trained American army. This was also one of the 
reasons the American soldiers would all get new metal helmets on their arrival in France, because 
Pershing had seen how important it was to be the best prepared, equipped army on the field.173
 However, the lessons didn’t stop there. One of the most important actions of Pershing during 
the First World War can be credited to his time in Manchuria. During the Russo-Japanese war, 
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Pershing saw how pointless and costly the large infantry attacks were. He was fiercely against using 
this tactic in France, but there weren’t many alternatives. Until the Battle of Saint-Mihiel, where 
Pershing ordered a young officer called Patton to attack with 419 tanks. The battle was an important 
victory and the new important role of armoured warfare was proven.174 So this can all be linked back 
to Pershing’s experiences during the Russo-Japanese war. To credit all of Perishing’s victories to his 
lessons of the Russo-Japanese war is of course debatable. Yet, it is difficult to claim that these lessons 
didn’t play a part in his role as Commander in Chief of the American forces. His friend, who later 
wrote Pershing’s biography, also agrees with this vision: “He had gone to Manchuria an accomplished 
small-unit leader, a master of light tactics; he came out skilled in the management of mass.”175 
 It can be said that the British military observer Ian Hamilton had learned the least from the 
Russo-Japanese war. Here won’t be a focus on the lessons that could or should have been learned, 
but only on the lessons that were learned. For Hamilton, these lessons mainly focused on the use of 
trench mortars, hand grenades and camouflage.176 These three big lessons definitely played a role in 
his Gallipoli campaign, yet they weren’t decisive. One big lesson that Hamilton believed he had also 
learned was that “superior morale is all that is needed to breach a defensive position.”177 This lesson 
we can now safely call a wrong lesson. Its effect was disastrous for the British forces at Gallipoli, and 
maybe even for the British war effort in general.      
  The German military observer Max Hoffman didn’t learn any big strategic lessons in 
Manchuria. He was focused on how the Russian army operated. However, the non-combat lessons 
would turn out to be the most important for Hoffman. The quarrel between the Russian 
Commanders Samsonov and Rennenkampf, would give Hoffman the opportunity to gain a massive 
victory at Tannenberg and directly influence the German war effort. 178   
 Hoffman also played a big role in changing the way in which the German military was training 
the Ottoman empire’s army. The German Otto von Sanders had new instructions when he was sent 
to the Ottoman Empire, based on the comments of Hoffman on the German training of the Japanese 
army.179 It Is difficult to pinpoint how important these new instructions were in training the Ottoman 
army. However, it is quite certain that the German training of the Ottoman army played a big role in 
their victory at Gallipoli over the British.        
 The last military observer Enrico Caviglia is the best example to link the Russo-Japanese war 
to the First World War. The lessons learned by Caviglia in Manchuria would play very important roles 
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in his time as officer in the Italian army during the First World War. From the very start of the war, 
Caviglia knew the current tactics that were being used by the Italian army weren’t useful in this new 
modern war.180 However, Caviglia was a low-ranking officer and so he had to obey his superiors who 
didn’t listen to his advice. It was only in September 1917 that Caviglia decided to not follow his 
orders, but to use his own tactics. He would focus on manoeuvre, “just as the Japanese did.”181 This 
resulted in a great victory, after which Caviglia gained more room from the Italian army command to 
make his own decisions. This resulted in a couple of brave and successful operations, such as crossing 
the river in the same manner as the Japanese had done at the Yalu River in 1904.182 Caviglia knew 
that the Japanese army had been trained by German officers, so he made the connection that now 
the German army would fight in a similar fashion as the Japanese had done in 1904. He was correct. 
This resulted in Caviglia being the only Italian officer to successfully retreat after the Battle of 
Caporetto. Caviglia knew that the Germans would try to flank around as the Japanese had done so 
many times in Manchuria, and so he was able to out manoeuvre the Germans.183  
  In the battle of Vittorio Veneto, Caviglia would finally lead an entire Italian army. Here he 
fully showed all the lessons he had learned from the Russo-Japanese war. He attacked with a small 
but precise artillery barrage, followed by a small flanking infantry group equipped with a lot of hand 
grenades. His attack was built on speed and not on huge numbers. After the first enemy trench was 
taken, Caviglia would order machineguns to take defensive positions while the other soldiers would 
advance, just as the Japanese army had done. In the end, the Italian Army would lose 40 thousand 
soldiers, while the Austro-Hungarians had 80 thousand casualties and 450 thousand soldiers were 
captured.184 This battle meant the end of the First World War in the Italian Alps.   
 There is no clearer example of how military lessons from the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-
1905 had an influence on the outcome of the First World War than the actions of Enrico Caviglia. He 
used all his acquired knowledge of the Japanese army against the German/Austro-Hungarian army. 
Because he had so thoroughly observed the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905, he knew all the 
strengths and weaknesses of tactics and the new modern weapons such as; the machine guns, hand 
grenades and long-range artillery.         
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Conclusion 
 
The main goal of this research was to find out if Western military observers, who would later 
command armies in the First World War, learned important military lessons from the Russo-Japanese 
war of 1904-1905. To answer this question the essay first focused on the Japanese and Russian 
armies that would fight this war. In this first two paragraphs it becomes clear that the two armies 
were very different. The Russian army relied on its huge numbers to win wars and so modernisation 
was less important than in other armies, while the smaller Japanese army relied fully on modernity 
and up to date weapons to win against Russia.   
  The third paragraph of chapter one showed an overview of the war. This information was 
needed as context for the second chapter. However, it did more than just gave context because it 
pointed out some interesting aspects of the war which indicate that this was indeed the first large 
scale modern war of the 20th century. This brings us to the last two paragraphs of chapter one, which 
had its focus entirely on the siege of Port Arthur. First, the landing of the Japanese army on the 
Lioadong peninsula was described. This landing was quite similar to the Gallipoli invasion during the 
First World War. It is necessary to give this information, so that the paragraph about the British 
Commander of the Gallipoli invasion, Ian Hamilton, can be fully understood.    
 The siege of Port Arthur itself lasted for more than six months and is the best example of 
how the fighting in the First World War would turn out to be. The in-depth description of the siege of 
Port Arthur showed a couple of important military lessons that could have been learned by the 
military observers. Although it wasn’t the main goal of this thesis, the first chapter really shows that 
the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905 was indeed the first large scale modern war of the twentieth 
century. This is thus a new argument for the idea that the military side of the war, based on its 
modernity, can be seen as part of the World War Zero concept.     
 This detailed description of the armies first, then a summary of the war, and finally the in-
depth story of the Siege of Port Arthur gives, the context and information needed to fully understand 
the second chapter. Chapter two first explains the role and history of military observers that is 
necessary to understand the role of the four chosen observers in Manchuria, and most importantly 
why they were there. Then the chapter discusses each military observer in a paragraph and shows 
what he learned and what he did with this information. The chapter ends with an analytic view of 
which lessons were learned and if they played a role in the outcome of the First World War.  
 Based on the information that is discussed in this final paragraph, we can conclude that the 
American observer John Pershing had learned important lessons from the Russo-Japanese war. These 
lessons would play a role in the formation of the new American army during the First World War and 
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thus the final allied victory. For the British military observer Ian Hamilton, we can conclude that he 
had learned some lessons from the Russo-Japanese War, but they weren’t major ones nor were they 
decisive. For Hamilton, there is also the wrong lesson that he learned from the Russo-Japanese war. 
Namely, the idea that superior morale is all that is needed to breach a defensive position, which 
would result in huge amounts of casualties and no victory at Gallipoli.     
 The third military observer that was discussed was the German Max Hoffman. For this 
observer, we can conclude that he hadn’t learned any major combat lessons. However, his time in 
Manchuria would play a big role in the fighting of the First World War. Thanks to his information 
about the Russian commanders that he had learned from his time with the Japanese army, Hoffman 
was able to gain a massive victory for Germany at the Battle of Tannenberg. Also, his comments on 
the German training of foreign troops resulted in new and better instructions for Otto von Sanders, 
who would train the Ottoman army just before World War One. The German trained Ottoman army 
proved to be effective and took the British by surprise during the Gallipoli campaign. This can also be 
seen as a consequence of the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905 that impacted the First World War.
 The fourth and last military observer that was looked at is the Italian Enrico Caviglia. We have 
seen that Caviglia had learned a lot from the Russo-Japanese war in the battle of Vittorio Veneto. 
Because, here Caviglia used all his acquired knowledge of the Japanese army against the German 
army. He knew all the strengths and weaknesses of new modern weapons and tactics. The reason 
that Caviglia had learned more than the other military observers might be because Caviglia was still 
young and in-experienced when he was sent to Manchuria. His lower rank also resulted in him not 
being able to make his own decisions like the other three commanders could during the first years of 
First World War. This is the great irony of this research. The military observer who had learned the 
most from the Russo-Japanese War was ignored for most of the First World War. 
  The answer to the main research question: ‘did Western military observers, who would later 
command armies in the First World War, learn important military lessons from the Russo-Japanese 
war of 1904-1905?,’ is yes. Based on the primary sources, it can be said that the military observers 
learned important lessons from the Russo-Japanese war which would play a role in the outcome of 
the First World War. This research proofs that trough the Western military observers, the Russo-
Japanese war had far reaching global consequences. Which in turn is a new argument for the concept 
of ‘World War Zero’.          
  In the first chapter this research also showed that the fighting in the Russo-Japanese war 
was modern, which can also be used as an argument for the ‘World War Zero’ concept. Based on the 
global consequences of the Russo-Japanese war, it should not be seen as just an imperialistic war 
between a European power and an Asian country, but instead it should be seen as ‘World War Zero’. 
 Even so, this doesn’t mean that the whole World War Zero concept is now proven. This thesis 
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focuses only on the modern way of fighting and the consequences of the Russo-Japanese war. 
Steinberg states that; the concept of World War Zero means that the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-
1905 was worldwide, in its causes, course, and consequences. This means that to fully prove this 
concept, there is yet much more work to be done on the global causes and the global course of the 
war.             
 For the historical debate, further research is necessary. This thesis has looked at four military 
observers, these were important men because of the role they played for their countries in World 
War One. There were however many more military observers present during the Russo-Japanese 
war, that can be studied in a similar manner. More research into these other military observers can 
perhaps show new information that could strengthen or weaken the conclusion of this thesis and in 
turn the concept of World War Zero.  
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